A Transactional "Second-Victim" Model-Experiences of Affected Healthcare Professionals in Acute-Somatic Inpatient Settings: A Qualitative Metasynthesis. by Schiess, Cornel et al.
1 
 
Journal / date of revision: Journal of Patient Safety / November, 18, 2017 1 
Manuscript-id:  JPS-15-658 2 
Category:  Review Article 3 
Word count: 3 624 (main text) 4 
Number of tables: 3 5 
Number of figures: 3 6 
Source of funding:   The authors declare no source of funding 7 
Conflict of interest:  Prof. Dr. Vanhaecht declares that he is involved in training 8 
activities and research projects on Second Victims in Belgium, 9 
The Netherlands and Italy. All other authores declares none 10 
conlicts of interest 11 
Title: A transactional "second victim"-model – experiences of affected healthcare 12 
professionals in acute-somatic inpatient settings: a qualitative metasynthesis 13 
Short title: A transactional "second victim"-model 14 
Cornel Schiess1*, David Schwappach2, René Schwendimann3, Kris Vanhaecht4, Melanie 15 
Burgstaller5, Beate Senn6 16 
 17 
1*MScN, RN, Research Associate, Institute of Applied Sciences IPW-FHS, University of 18 
Applied Sciences FHS St.Gallen, Rosenbergstrasse 59, 9001 St. Gallen, Switzerland; 19 
cornel.schiess@fhsg.ch, Tel.: +41 71 226 15 27, Fax: +41 71 226 14 01 (*Corresponding 20 
author) 21 
2Prof. Dr., MPH, Head of Research and Development, Patient Safety Switzerland, 22 
Asylstrasse 77, 8032 Zurich, Switzerland; Institute of Social and Preventive Medicine (ISPM), 23 
University of Bern, Finkenhubelweg 11, 3012 Bern, Switzerland; 24 
schwappach@patientensicherheit.ch 25 
3PD Dr., RN, Chief Patient Safety Officer, University Hospital Basel, Spitalstrasse 22, 4031 26 
Basel, Switzerland; rene.schwendimann@usb.ch 27 
4Prof. Dr., Assistant Professor Faculty of Medicine and Head of Patient Safety and Quality, 28 
Leuven Institute for Healthcare Policy, Catholic University Leuven, Kapucijnenvoer 35 blok d 29 
– box 7001, 3000 Leuven, Belgium; kris.vanhaecht@kuleuven.be 30 
5MScN, RN, Research Associate, Institute of Applied Sciences IPW-FHS, University of 31 
Applied Sciences FHS St.Gallen, Rosenbergstrasse 59, 9001 St. Gallen, Switzerland; 32 
melanie.burgstaller@fhsg.ch 33 
6 Prof. Dr. phil, RN, Head & Project Manager, Institute of Applied Sciences IPW-FHS, 34 
University of Applied Sciences FHS St.Gallen, Rosenbergstrasse 59, 9001 St. Gallen, 35 
2 
 
Switzerland; Research Affiliate, Sydney Nursing School, University of Sydney, Sydney, 36 
Australia; beate.senn@fhsg.ch 37 
Acknowledgements 38 
We are grateful to Prof. Dr. André Fringer for methodological consultation and all experts for 39 
their contributions to the identification of studies. 40 
Contributors 41 
Study design: CS, DS, RS, KV, BS; data collection: CS; study selection; CS, MB; data 42 
analysis: CS, DS, RS, KV, BS; manuscript preparation: CS, DS, RS, KV, BS 43 
Presentations 44 
This work was presented in part at the annual conference of the Active Alliance for Patient 45 
Safety (APS) in Berlin, Germany, 04.–05.05.2017 and at the careArt basel’17 conference of 46 
the University Hospital of Basel, Switzerland, 08.–09.06.2017; the corresponding slides are 47 
published in German under the following link:  http://www.aps-ev.de/wp-48 
content/uploads/2017/05/11-Schiess.pdf 49 
Transparency declaration 50 
The lead author (manuscript's guarantor) affirms that this manuscript is an honest, accurate, 51 
and transparent account of the study being reported; that no important aspects of the study 52 
have been omitted; and that any discrepancies from the study as planned (and, if relevant, 53 
registered) have been explained. 54 
3 
 
ABSTRACT 55 
Background: "Second victims" are healthcare professionals traumatized by involvement in 56 
significant adverse events. Associated burdens, e.g., guilt, can impair professional 57 
performance, thereby endangering patient safety. To date, however, a model of second 58 
victims’ experiences towards a deeper understanding of qualitative studies is missing. 59 
Therefore, we aimed to identify, describe and interpret these experiences in acute-somatic 60 
inpatient settings. 61 
Methods: This qualitative metasynthesis reflects a systematic literature search of PubMed, 62 
CINAHL and PsycINFO, extended by hand searches and expert consultations. Two 63 
researchers independently evaluated qualitative studies in German and English, assessing 64 
study quality via internationally approved criteria. Results were aggregated quantitatively and 65 
analysed inductively. 66 
Results: Based on 19 qualitative studies (explorative-descriptive: n=13; grounded theory: 67 
n=3; phenomenology: n=3), a model of second victim experience was drafted. This depicts a 68 
multi-stage developmental process: in appraising their situation, second victims focus on 69 
their involvement in an adverse event and become traumatized. To restore their integrity, 70 
they attempt to understand the event and to act accordingly; however, their reactions are 71 
commonly emotional and issue-focused. Outcomes include leaving the profession, surviving 72 
or thriving. This development process is alternately modulated by safety culture and 73 
healthcare professionals. 74 
Conclusions: For the first time, this model works systematically from the second-victim 75 
perspective based on qualitative studies. Based on our findings, we recommend integrating 76 
second victims’ experiences into safety culture and root-cause analyses. Our transactional 77 
model of second victim experience provides a foundation for strategies to maintain and 78 
improve patient safety. 79 
Word count: 239 80 
Key words: adverse events; human error; patient safety; safety culture; qualitative research 81 
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INTRODUCTION 82 
The term "second victim", introduced by Wu (2000), describing healthcare professionals 83 
traumatized via involvement in serious adverse events.1,2 Having unintentionally caused 84 
harm to patients ("first victims"), many consider these events as personal failures, losing their 85 
confidence as clinicians and professionals.1,2 However, in today's complex healthcare 86 
environments, eventual involvement in a serious adverse event is normal.3 When adverse 87 
events–defined by their potential for harm4–affect patients, guilt, frustration, and fear can 88 
impair involved healthcare professionals’ performance, further endangering patient safety.3 89 
Hilfiker (1984) and Leape (1994) highlighted human fallibility in medical settings;5,6 and in 90 
2000, the US Institute of Medicine published "To err is human".7 That report estimated that 91 
up to 98 000 persons died annually in the US from medical errors, leading to associated 92 
expenses as high as 29 billion USD.7 Current estimates place the annual death relating to 93 
adverse events up to 440 000.8 However, even these figures are questionable: many cases 94 
go unreported, as therapy- and disease-related harm are often indistinguishable.9 95 
Internationally, while patient safety is a global priority, the incidence rate of adverse events is 96 
14.2 per 100 hospitalisations per year in high-income countries.10,11 97 
From 2009–2017, review articles focused on qualitative and quantitative second-victim 98 
studies of varying explanatory power in the US, Asia and Europe.3,12–16 These indicated that 99 
second victims experience intense emotional burdens (e.g., burnout and depression), 100 
impacting their personal relationships, their professional collaborations, their physical health, 101 
and even their institutions ("third victims").3,12–14,16 102 
However, while supportive environmental conditions (e.g., support from colleagues) are 103 
beneficial, many institutional reactions simply compound the damage.3,13 Ideally, care teams 104 
and superiors support their affected colleagues, while their organizations ensure that 105 
supportive structures are embedded in their safety culture.3,12–16 Research has yet to identify 106 
how to relieve second victims’ burdens while considering short- and long-term affects to 107 
safety culture.3,12,15 108 
Within healthcare organizational culture, safety culture reflects management and staff values, 109 
attitudes, perceptions, competencies and behaviours regarding individual fallibility.17 110 
Therefore security-promoting behaviour depends not only on individual character, but on 111 
collectively shared values.18 112 
Although increasing numbers of differentiated, empirical studies illuminate second victims’ 113 
experiences, no review article have systematically aggregated nor interpreted regarding 114 
theory formation and development. Moreover, shortages of theoretical associations often 115 
preclude in-depth understanding of interactions. Even though, e.g., Lazarus’ stress model or 116 
Antonovsky’s concept of salutogenesis help elucidate second victim experience e.g. by 117 
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means of cognitive appraisals relating to stress or a jeopardized Sense of Coherence,19,20 yet 118 
no available model explains the overall second-victim construct. 119 
Until now, strategies to maintain or improve patient safety have focused on affected patients. 120 
By shifting "from a personal to a systemic perspective" incident analyses and safety culture 121 
promotion become strategic pillars of patient safety21. Regarding healthcare priorities and 122 
lack of support for many second victims,10,12–14,16 a model of their experience will, by 123 
increasing the visibility of the often neglected experiences of second victims, contribute to a 124 
higher level of awareness regarding this vulnerable group. 125 
This qualitative metasynthesis is rooted in holistic thinking akin to pragmatism and aims to 126 
describe and interpret second victims’ experiences in acute-somatic settings from this 127 
group’s perspective. We approach experience as a learning process evolving and generating 128 
meanings between the individual and the context.22–24 129 
METHODS 130 
This qualitative metasynthesis follows Sandelowski and Barroso’s (2007) steps: goalsetting, 131 
literature search, evaluation of studies, classification of results, metasynthesis and 132 
metasummary.25 The ENTREQ statement was used to ensure methodical rigour.26 133 
Goalsetting and literature search 134 
The SPIDER structure was used for goalsetting and keywords (table 1), referring to the 135 
SPIDER structure and associated with Boolean operators, were used to search in PubMed, 136 
CINAHL und PsycINFO without temporal limitations (27.09.2016, update: 23.12.2016).27 137 
[Table 1: Search string in PubMed, CINAHL and PsycINFO] 138 
Additionally, we searched reference lists of included studies, other systematic reviews, study 139 
protocols, professional publications, dissertations, and monographs, and contacted authors 140 
(n=22). 141 
We included original German- and English-language articles offering insight into second-142 
victim experience based on qualitative designs, and conducted interviews, predominantly of 143 
healthcare professionals in acute-care inpatient settings. We excluded studies in other 144 
languages, non-original articles, mixed-methods studies, non-research-based articles and 145 
first-level interpretations (e.g. interview transcripts). 146 
Evaluation of studies 147 
For the initial screening, the first and fifth author independently checked all titles and 148 
abstracts according to predefined inclusion criteria. Next, they read potentially relevant full 149 
texts. For both steps, inter-rater reliability was determined.28,29 We discussed discrepancies 150 
until we reached consensus. 151 
For individual evaluation, following Sandelowski and Barroso’s guidance, the authors read all 152 
included studies repeatedly with increasing attention to detail, and wrote synopses of all.25 153 
For overarching conclusions, they tabulated and compared study evaluations.25  154 
6 
Classification of results 155 
The first author dichotomized the result sections of all included studies as first- or second-156 
level interpretations, and evaluated each one’s methodology regarding design, sample, data 157 
collection and analysis.30 The fifth author verified 47% of these evaluations. 158 
Metasynthesis 159 
We performed an inductive qualitative data analysis using MAXQDA V.12.31 "First cycle 160 
coding" involved line-by-line micro-analysis of second-level interpretations of the included 161 
studies’ results sections.31 Via splitting, we grouped qualitative data into open, inductive 162 
single-word- or phrase-based codes.31 "Second cycle coding" differentiated categories by 163 
means of subcodes and codes.31 This resulted in a conceptual model.31 164 
Metasummary 165 
To avoid under- or overrating individual findings we quantitatively aggregated qualitative 166 
data.25 After extracting, paraphrasing, categorizing and abstracting as parts of the 167 
metasynthesis described above, we calculated via the following formulas by means of code 168 
frequencies, which results were the most frequent across the studies (frequency) and how 169 
much each study contributed to the analysis (intensity): 170 
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 = number of publications of a certain category (n = 16)total number of publications  (n = 19)  
𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑓 = number of categories per publication   (n = 4)total number of categories (n = 5)  
Trustworthiness 171 
To ensure our results’ trustworthiness, we applied Sandelowski and Barroso’s descriptive, 172 
interpretative, theoretical, and pragmatic validity criteria.25 The first author’s in-depth 173 
familiarity with the second victim issue contributed to his nuanced understanding of this 174 
subject. In addition, regular meetings within the research team contributed to this study’s 175 
interpretative and theoretical validity. Furthermore, the comprehensive and systematic 176 
literature search, the metasummary and the inclusion of studies with heterogeneous 177 
epistemiological bases strengthened the interpretative and theoretical validity. The research 178 
steps described above  further strengthened our results’ descriptive and pragmatic validity.25 179 
RESULTS 180 
Included studies 181 
Evaluations of the chosen studies’ titles and abstracts (figure 1) resulted in high inter-rater 182 
reliability (𝑘=0.78); full-text evaluations yielded near-perfect inter-rater reliability (𝑘=0.96), 183 
leading to inclusion of 19 studies.2,32–49 For reasons of methodological quality, no studies 184 
were excluded (figure 2).25 185 
[Figure 1: Flow diagram of included studies] 186 
[Figure 2: Methodological quality of included studies] 187 
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The 19 between 1992 and 2016 published studies (explorative-descriptive 188 
studies2,32,33,35,36,39,43–49, grounded theories34,37,42, phenomenologies38,40,41) involved 478 189 
predominantly medical or nursing healthcare professionals of both genders (nphysicians=325 and 190 
nnurses=131) in American (nstudies=9), European (nstudies=8) and Asian (nstudies=2) hospitals. 191 
Despite diverse descriptions and definitions of adverse events, all focused on the healthcare 192 
professionals' response to actual or potential patient harm. (table 2) 193 
 [Table 2: Study characteristics] 194 
Metasynthesis: Transactional "second victim" experience 195 
Our metasynthesis outlined a transactional "second victim" experience model (figure 3). 196 
Vertically, this represents a system open to external influences, with mutual modulation 197 
between safety culture and healthcare professionals. Due to reciprocity, indicated by arrows, 198 
safety culture is both a central influencing factor regarding affected healthcare professionals 199 
and an endpoint. 200 
Horizontally, iterative development begins with appraising the situation, extending first to 201 
restoring integrity, then continuing professional life. Between appraising the situation and 202 
restoring integrity, healthcare professionals weigh their internal and external resources. For 203 
example, they activate personal resources and receive assistance from colleagues via safety 204 
culture.49 However, while second victims often need support urgently2,32,38,43–49 and search for 205 
"emotional relief valves",35,49 they tend to deny themselves such support via undemanding or 206 
unreceptive behaviour.32,34,39,41,46,48,49 207 
"Several claimed that they did not have any expectations about getting support because they 208 
had made a mistake, and therefore had to bear the consequences themselves."46, p.321 209 
[Figure 3: Transactional "second victim" experience] 210 
Safety culture and healthcare professionals 211 
Safety culture influences whether and to what extent healthcare professionals become 212 
second victims.2,36,41,43,47–49 Acknowledgment of second victims’ need for help is a first step 213 
toward overcoming the negative consequences of the „blame-shame culture” that dominates 214 
many institutions.2,32,34,36,38,40,41,43,44,46,47,49 215 
Communicative processes are formative in a safety culture. For example, speaking to first 216 
victims can be therapeutic for second victims; however, emotional issues for both first and 217 
second victims can make discussions challenging.32,33,35,37–42,46 Considering second victims’ 218 
damaged professional confidence, they often share their feelings with friends rather than 219 
medical professionals.2,32,33,35–37,40–42,44,46–49 While this informal support channel usually 220 
involves persons with no professional healthcare background,33,35,46–49 the advantage of 221 
disclosing one’s inner feelings and preserving a perspective "from the outside" can outweigh 222 
the disadvantages.2,33,35 While professional assistance offers both trustability and a neutral 223 
perspective, it can also be associated with stigmatization. 49,38 And while empathic and 224 
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sympathetic team behaviour can benefit second victims, staying silent or minimizing an event 225 
can be regressive.34,39,40,48 Likewise, within a robust safety culture, superiors can use adverse 226 
events to imprint that culture via role modeling,38,46,47 e.g., cultivating a trustful, systemic 227 
perspective on errors and addressing informational needs e.g. concerning support 228 
programs.2,37,39,44,45,47–49 229 
"The respondents within this study suggested that none of these support systems are 230 
possible if there is not an organizational patient safety culture."49, p. 9 231 
Depending on the event’s seriousness, second victims are often eager both to learn and to 232 
contribute to safety culture via root-cause analyses (RCA).35,37,39,41,42,47,48 As understanding 233 
and acting require readiness to learn, training and further education are vital not only to 234 
preventing adverse events, but to responding to their occurance.33,39,44,47–49 235 
Healthcare professionals respond similarly to different events, based on their 236 
seriousness.2,33,35,36,40,41,48,49 In the conflict between expectation and reality, personally 237 
experienced responsibility is of major importance for many second victims.32,34–37,41,43,45,48 238 
Reactions can also depend upon personal traits, e.g., self-efficacy, resilience, perfectionism 239 
or professional experience, spirituality, and gender aspects.2,33,37,38,40–42,47–49 E.g., as a result 240 
of a perfectionism, healthcare professionals may be more affected by feelings of guilt when 241 
they interpret errors as individual failures and seek zero tolerance for errors.  242 
Appraising the situation: Experiencing stress and trauma  243 
After initial incomprehension, second victims realise their responsibility for avoidable 244 
events.2,34,40,44,46,48 In our model, only events associated with significant stress have further 245 
relevance. Non-stressful events can inspire either a sense of well-being (good luck) or 246 
learning.35,36,41,47 247 
After initial nonspecific stress experience (e.g., shock), second victims respond rather 248 
physiologically or rather psychosocially.32–34,40,46–49 Physically, common symptoms range from 249 
sleep disturbance to muscular tension.2,33,34,38,41,43,44,46–49 Psychosocial responses are 250 
characterized by a sense of damaged personal integrity:32,33,35,37,38,40,43,45–47,49  251 
"Nurses expressed feelings of guilt because they felt that they had oppressed or betrayed 252 
someone who had needed them and had trusted them with his or her life."40, p. 5 253 
Having participated in a serious adverse event, second victims suffer severely conflicting 254 
emotions: having caused suffering, some feel they should suffer;32–41,43,45–49 having suffered 255 
trauma, many experience anxiety and panic, with potential health consequences.2,33–35,37,40,43–256 
46,48,50 A broad variety of anxieties of second victims are related both to the harm of first 257 
victims and to their own situation as second victims, e.g. anxiety to loss of trust and legal 258 
consequences.2,33,34,40,41,43–46,48,49 Additionally, feelings of inadequacy, uncertainty, and 259 
reduced self-confidence often arise.2,32–35,37,38,40,44–49 Other consequences can include 260 
flashbacks, burnout syndrome, depression and suicidal thoughts.2,33,37,40,41,44–46,48,49 On a 261 
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personal level, psychosocial responses swing between anger-frustration and regret-262 
repentance; on a professional level, reduced performance can manifest as efficiency deficits 263 
or defensive decision-making.2,32–38,40,41,44,46,48,49 264 
Unlike normal stressful events, second victim experiences include incisive trauma, with 265 
effects extending beyond initial stress responses and leaving a profound impression at both 266 
private and professional levels.2,32–35,37,40,41,43–49 267 
Restoring integrity: Understanding and acting 268 
Second victims need an internally and externally motivated (e.g., by superiors) restoration of 269 
integrity.2,32,33,37,42,46,49 The emotion- and event-oriented process of acting on traumatic 270 
experience can be rather constructive or rather destructive. Focusing on understanding and 271 
acting, its aim is to achieve a return to work as soon as possible, with regained self-272 
esteem.2,34–37,39,41,42,46,48,49 A discursive process combining reconciliation/forgiveness with 273 
coping with imperfection has proved key to returning to professional life.33,34,36,37,42,46 274 
Repressive mechanisms, e.g., rationalisation, self-punishment, minimalisation, are 275 
destructive emotion-oriented responses to adverse events; more constructive emotion-276 
oriented strategies, e.g., disclosing the event to the first victim often receive high priority, but 277 
can have complex outcomes:32–37,39–43,45–49 278 
"Although they were comforted when the family forgave them or grieved alongside them, 279 
surgeons also recognised difficulty with these interactions."37, p. 1184 280 
Many second victims wish to apologize to their corresponding first victims but received 281 
lawyers’ recommendations to maintain silence.34,39,42,43 For some, disclosing the event results 282 
from a process of consideration.33,34,36–38,40,42,45,46,48 Depending on the level of harm and "real" 283 
error, second victims may disclose varying degrees of detail.33,34,36,37,40,42,45,46,48 In this 284 
respect, along with events that cause harm with potential legal consequences, for well-known 285 
events are favourable for disclosure; unknown error events, as well as anxiety and minor 286 
length of service on the part of the second victim, are unfavourable.34,36 287 
While minimalisation is a rather destructive task-oriented way of dealing with an event, 288 
constructive task-oriented strategies, e.g., learning, rank among the most helpful.2,32–38,40–289 
44,46,48,49 In the short term, second victims strive to reduce harm in first victims and to restore 290 
medical stability;33,35,40,43 in the medium term, they wish to participate in root-cause analyses 291 
to prevent recurrences of their experiences and to optimize the system, e.g., via error 292 
prevention programs;2,33–35,37–39,41,42,44,47–49 and in the long term, it is necessary to extension 293 
perspectives towards fallibility.34,40,42 Expressions of this include improvement-oriented 294 
behaviour patterns, increased mindfulness with regard to imperfectness, and self-care, as 295 
well as increased patient-centricity.2,33,37,41–44,46,49 296 
Continuing professional work: Finding meaning 297 
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Traumatic second victim experience also has a long-term existential effect on professional 298 
life.46 Re-evaluation and perceived meaning can both support private and professional 299 
improvement of the situation.42 300 
While second victims with serious professional doubts may change their positions or leave 301 
their profession, some second victims continue their profession lives with unimpaired 302 
performance despite a trajectory of burden and reduced work satisfaction 303 
(surviving).2,32,36,37,44,46,48,49 304 
Most desirably, thriving can follow a positive turn of a traumatic experience, characterized by 305 
enhanced expertise and an evolved personality.2,33,37,42,44,45 Both can manifest in improved 306 
handling of complexity and uncertainty, as well as in a revised view of oneself and the world. 307 
Second victims who have regained their self-confidence see themselves as imperfect, but 308 
good healthcare professionals:33,37,42,44,45 309 
"[in]<the humble expert>… physicians described learning to temper their expertise with 310 
humility and learning to have confidence without being cocky." 42, p. 240 311 
Metasummary 312 
As table 3 shows, all included studies contributed to one or more of three categories: safety 313 
culture, appraising the situation, and restoring integrity; 58% contributed to all categories.2,32–314 
34,36,37,41,42,45,48,49 The median contribution of each study was 5%; the most recent and the 315 
oldest were most influential.33,49  316 
[Table 3: Metasummary] 317 
DISCUSSION 318 
This qualitative metasynthesis highlighted, described and interpreted second victim 319 
experiences in acute-somatic settings. Based on nineteen qualitative studies, the main 320 
outcome is a model of transactional second victim experience. Including the central stages of 321 
appraising the situation, restoring integrity and continuing professional life, this experience is 322 
moderated by safety culture and healthcare professionals. The model finds its theoretical 323 
foundation in Lazarus’ model of stress, as well as in Antonovsky’s "sense of coherence".19,20 324 
Against the background of a primarily physiological experience,3 we assumed that supporting 325 
a person to restore their integrity could prevent long-term pathological consequences. There 326 
is some evidence, that support from peers and superiors can have a protective influence on 327 
burnout.51 A prospective longitudinal study showed that, in the context of serious adverse 328 
events, assistant physicians have significantly increased burnout scores and a threefold 329 
elevated risk of depression.52 330 
Scott (2015) reaffirmed that safety culture can be both a key factor of support, and a 331 
measurable endpoint.53 Additionally to the wish of second victims for cultural change and 332 
learning needs, the authors emphasized the importance of communication with first victims, 333 
support by peers and superiors, and external emotional support as factors of a positive 334 
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safety culture. These factors are congruent with safety culture features described 335 
elsewhere.54 336 
An organization’s treatment of second victims reflects its safety culture and represents an 337 
important aspect of socialization. Ideally, adverse events offer team learning opportunities. 338 
Regarding organizational support and underscoring the importance of results from Burlison 339 
et al. (2016), alongside absenteeism, their results associate intention to abandon one’s 340 
workplace significantly with the support of peers and superiors.55 In fact, peer support is the 341 
strongest predictor of second victims’ recovery;55 and Edrees et al. (2016) observed that 342 
recovery can be improved and promoted via institutionalised telephone support from 343 
colleagues.56 However, the current results support the literature’s indications that collegial 344 
readiness to support second victims can be limited:57 barriers to support programs’ use 345 
include missing knowledge about their availability and doubts regarding their reliability.56,58,59 346 
After the initial stress response, the second victim’s appraisal of the situation is influenced by 347 
feelings of guilt and reduced professional performance. In systematic reviews, guilt was the 348 
those most frequently reported emotional response.12,14,16 The current results concerning 349 
second victims' efficiency deficits and tendencies towards defensive decision-making confirm 350 
the thesis regarding reciprocity of error involvement, post-traumatic stress response, and 351 
endangered patient safety due to reduced professional performance.3 352 
Disclosing the event relates significantly to reducing guilt feelings and can contribute to 353 
restoring ones sense of integrity; however, disclosure only occurred in a third of cases.60 The 354 
present metasynthesis described disclosure as a process of consideration, which is also 355 
expressed in a just recently published "qualitative systematic review" (nStudies=9) using the 356 
Joanna Briggs Institute meta-aggregation approach about second victim experiences of 357 
predominantly female nurses, which describes disclosing as a dilemma.61 Reasons for 358 
forgoing disclosure include fear of legal consequences, deficient communication skills, and 359 
inadequate support.60 Interprofessional skill training could overcome missing communication 360 
skills; this would benefit the second victim by increasing the chances of the first victim 361 
directly forgiving them.60,62,63 According to the outlined potential of disclosing adverse events 362 
on the recovery of second victims, it is necessary to establish guidelines and structures that 363 
promote, instead of often selective, full disclosure; this not only as a strategy to reduce 364 
liability damages, but also to meet ethical obligations to first and second victims.64–67   365 
This metasummary on the one hand offers comprehensive state of knowledge regarding 366 
safety culture, situational appraisal and restoring integrity. On the other hand, it illuminates 367 
knowledge gaps concerning destructive forms of dealing with the event. This knowledge gap 368 
may result from an underlying selection bias of included studies. It is possible that only 369 
second victims with predominantly constructive strategies for dealing with adverse events are 370 
recruited for studies, as others are unavailable due to changing their profession. However, 371 
12 
especially during a deepening skills shortage, further knowledge should be obtained by 372 
identifying the perspectives of colleagues who support second victims.68 Not disclosing an 373 
event proved to be the most frequent defensive coping strategy in the review by Seys et al. 374 
(2013).14 375 
Limitations 376 
To the authors’ knowledge, the current model offers the first conceptual framework to 377 
understand second victim experience across professions and cultures. Despite efforts to 378 
ensure reliability, the results should be seen in the context of two major limitations. For the 379 
most part, only one person evaluated the methodological quality of included studies and 380 
coded the data of only German- and English-language articles in German. Additionally, being 381 
three-times removed from direct experience may have diminished the results’ credibility 382 
during interpretation. 383 
CONCLUSIONS 384 
The newly developed model works for the first time systematically from the second victim 385 
perspective based on qualitative studies including majoritarian physicians and nurses. This 386 
perspective should increasingly be applied to daily practice to promote institutional safety 387 
culture. As a platform upon which to refine policies fostering professional development and 388 
preservation, the new model contributes ultimately to patient safety. 389 
Implications for practice 390 
Many organizations are unprepared for serious adverse events.69 The need for hospitals to 391 
conceive second victim experience as a clinical emergency and to prepare accordingly is 392 
emphasized.70 393 
Our results indicate that hospital safety culture affects not only patients, but healthcare 394 
professionals. Therefore, safety culture can provide a path to support second victims in 395 
restoring their integrity. These results indicate a scope for integrating second victims in RCA, 396 
in the elaboration and implementation of recommendations for event disclosure to first 397 
victims, in ensuring a trustful approach to superiors, in learning from a systemic viewpoint 398 
and in communicating existing support programs. While the effectiveness of RCA in learning 399 
from errors and preventing recurrences can be questioned, RCA has the potential to relief 400 
burdens of affected healthcare professionals at the sharp end due to insights in the 401 
systematic emergence of adverse events.71,72  402 
Implications for education 403 
Stakeholders in education should meet second victims’ request for a culture prepared for 404 
adverse events. One central prerequisite would be curricular integration of the second victim 405 
experience on all levels of healthcare professional education. In this regard definitions and 406 
descriptions of factors triggering second victim phenomena, consequences, theoretical 407 
frameworks, support systems, and barriers to support are all relevant.73 The second victim 408 
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transactional model can support curriculum development, transmit a valid knowledge base 409 
and contribute to socialization in dealing with human fallibility. 410 
Implications for research 411 
According to the current knowledge concerning safety culture, appraisal of adverse event 412 
situations and restoration of integrity, further research should focus on developing and 413 
implementing effective supportive interventions. Therefore, the model of transactional second 414 
victim experience provides a valid knowledge base and promotes the integration of the 415 
affected persons’ perspectives. Investigating the effectiveness of supportive interventions 416 
and examining the problem vis-à-vis payers will require development and evaluation of 417 
culture-specific instruments to assess second victim experience including support. For 418 
practical use, an instrument such as the Burlison’s et al. (2017) could facilitate discussions 419 
and supportive approaches.74 To ensure targeted support in the early, it should differentiate 420 
between second victim experience and burnout or depression. The newly developed 421 
transactional model of second victim experience will contribute to this. 422 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 423 
We are grateful to Prof. Dr. André Fringer for methodological consultation and all experts for 424 
their contributions to the identification of studies. 425 
14 
REFERENCES 426 
1. Wu AW. Medical error: The second victim: the doctor who makes the mistake needs help 427 
too. BMJ 2000;320:726–7. 428 
2. Scott SD, Hirschinger LE, Cox KR, et al. The natural history of recovery for the healthcare 429 
provider "second victim" after adverse patient events. Qual Saf Health Care 430 
2009;18:325–30. 431 
3. Schwappach DL, Boluarte TA. The emotional impact of medical error involvement on 432 
physicians: a call for leadership and organisational accountability. Swiss Med Wkly 433 
2009;139:9–15. 434 
4. World Health Organization. Conceptual Framework for the International Classiciation for 435 
Patient Safety Version 1.1: Final Technical Report. Geneva: World Health Organization, 436 
2009. 437 
5. Hilfiker D. Facing our mistakes. N Engl J Med 1984;310:118–22. 438 
6. Leape LL. Error in medicine. JAMA 1994;272:1851–7. 439 
7. Kohn LT, Corrigan JM, Donaldson MS. To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System. 440 
Washington: National Academy Press, 2000. 441 
8. James JT. A new, evidence-based estimate of patient harms associated with hospital 442 
care. J Patient Saf 2013;9:122–8. 443 
9. Vincent C. Das ABC der Patientensicherheit [Schriftenreihe Nr. 4]. Zürich: 444 
Patientensicherheit Schweiz, 2012. 445 
10. World Health Organization. Global Priorities for Patient Safety Research: Better 446 
Knowledge for Safer Care. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2009. 447 
11. Jha AK, Larizgoitia I, Audera-Lopez C, et al. The global burden of unsafe medical care: 448 
analytic modelling of observational studies. BMJ Qual Saf 2013;22:809–15. 449 
12. Sirriyeh R, Lawton R, Gardner P, et al. Coping with medical error: a systematic review of 450 
papers to assess the effects of involvement in medical errors on healthcare professionals' 451 
psychological well-being. BMJ Qual Saf 2010;19:e43. 452 
13. Lewis EJ, Baernholdt M, Hamric AB. Nursesʼ experience of medical errors. J Nurs Care 453 
Qual 2013;28:153–61. 454 
14. Seys D, Wu AW, van Gerven E, et al. Health care professionals as second victims after 455 
adverse events: a systematic review. Eval Health Prof 2013;36:135–62. 456 
15. Seys D, Scott S, Wu A, et al. Supporting involved health care professionals (second 457 
victims) following an adverse health event: a literature review. Int J Nurs Stud 458 
2013;50:678–87. 459 
16. Chan ST, Khong PCB, Wang W. Psychological responses, coping and supporting needs 460 
of healthcare professionals as second cictims. Int Nurs Rev 2016;64:242–62. 461 
15 
17. Health and Safety Commission Advisory Committee on the Safety of Nuclear 462 
Installations. Third Report of the ACSNI Study Group on Human Factors: Organizing for 463 
Safety. Sudbury: HSE Books, 1993. 464 
18. Pfaff H, Hammer A, Ernstmann N, et al. Safety culture: definitions, models and design. Z 465 
Evid Fortb Qual Gesundheitswes 2009;103:493–7. 466 
19. Lazarus RS. Stress, Bewältigung und Emotionen: Entwicklung eines Modells. In: Rice 467 
VH, Hrsg. Stress und Coping: Lehrbuch für Pflegepraxis und -wissenschaft. Bern: Huber; 468 
2005:231–363. 469 
20. Antonovsqi A, Franke A, Hrsg. Salutogenese: Zur Entmystifizierung der Gesundheit. 470 
Tübingen: DGVT-Verlag, 1997. 471 
21. Reason J. Human error: Models and management. BMJ 2000;320:768–70. 472 
22. Watson SJ. An analysis of the concept of experience. J Adv Nurs 1991;16:1117–21. 473 
23. Ballnat S. Das Verhältnis zwischen den Begriffen "Erfahrung" und "Sprache" ausgehend 474 
von Hans-Georg Gadamers "Wahrheit und Methode": Eine antireduktionistische Lesart 475 
gegen Relativismusvorwürfe [Dissertation]. Potsdam: Universität Potsdam, 2012. 476 
24. Ricken F. Glauben weil es vernünftig ist. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007. 477 
25. Sandelowski M, Barroso J. Handbook for Synthesizing Qualitative Research. New York: 478 
Springer; 2007. 479 
26. Tong A, Flemming K, McInnes E, Oliver S, Craig J. Enhancing transparency in reporting 480 
the synthesis of qualitative research: ENTREQ. BMC Med Res. 2012;12:181. 481 
27. Cooke A, Smith D, Booth A. Beyond PICO: the SPIDER tool for qualitative evidence 482 
synthesis. Qual Health Res. 2012;22:1435–43. 483 
28. Cohen J. A coefficient of agreement for nominal scales. Educ Psychol Meas 1960;20:37–484 
46. 485 
29. Landis JR, Koch GG. The measurement of observer agreement for categorical data. 486 
Biometrics 1977;33:159–74. 487 
30. Panfil E, Ivanovic N. Methodenpapier FIT-Nursing Care: Version 1.0. June, 2011. 488 
Available at: 489 
https://www.fitcare.ch/documents/8165518/0/110615_Methodenpapier_FIT%2BNC_Juni.490 
pdf/a6d68f1c-55c9-4d09-982f-b40a374c0b2c. Accessed November 16, 2017. 491 
31. Saldaña J. The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers. Los Angeles: Sage, 2015. 492 
32. Balogun JA, Bramall AN, Bernstein M. How surgical trainees handle catastrophic errors: 493 
a qualitative study. J Surg Educ 2015;72:1179–84. 494 
33. Christensen JF, Levinson W, Dunn PM. The heart of darkness: the impact of perceived 495 
mistakes on physicians. J Gen Intern Med 1992;7:424–31. 496 
16 
34. Crigger NJ, Meek VL. Toward a theory of self-reconciliation following mistakes in nursing 497 
practice. J Nurs Scholarsh 2007;39:177–83. 498 
35. Engel KG, Rosenthal M, Sutcliffe KM. Residents' responses to medical error: coping, 499 
learning and change. Acad Med 2006;81:86–93. 500 
36. Kroll L, Singleton A, Collier J, et al. Learning not to take it seriously: junior doctors' 501 
accounts of error. Med Educ 2008;42:982–90. 502 
37. Luu S, Patel P, St-Martin L, et al. Waking up the next morning: surgeons' emotional 503 
reactions to adverse events. Med Educ 2012;46:1179–88. 504 
38. Mankaka C, Waeber G, Gachoud D. Female residents experiencing medical errors in 505 
general internal medicine: a qualitative study. BMJ Med Educ 2014;14:140. 506 
39. May N, Plews-Ogan M. The role of talking (and keeping silent) in physician coping with 507 
medical error: a qualitative study. Patient Educ Couns 2012;88:449–54. 508 
40. Mohsenpour M, Hosseini MA, Abbaszadeh A, et al. Iranian nurses' experience of "being a 509 
wrongdoer": a phenomenological study. Nurs Ethics 2016; 510 
doi:10.1177/0969733016660880 511 
41. Pinto A, Faiz O, Bicknell C, et al. Surgical complications and their implications for 512 
surgeons' well-being. Br J Surg 2013;100:1748–55. 513 
42. Plews-Ogan M, Owens JE, May NB. Wisdom through adversity: learning and growing in 514 
the wake of an error. Patient Educ Couns 2013;91:236–22. 515 
43. Rassin M, Kanti T, Silner D. Chronology of medication errors by nurses: accumulation of 516 
stresses and PTSD symptoms. Issues Ment Health Nurs 2005;26(8):873–86. 517 
44. Rinaldi C, Leigheb F, Vanhaecht K, et al. Becoming a "second victim" in health care: 518 
pathway of recovery after adverse event. Rev Calid Asist 2016;31:11–19. 519 
45. Santos JO, Silva AEBdC, Munari DB, et al. Feelings of nursing professionals after the 520 
occurrence of medication errors. Acta Paul Enferm 2007;20:483–8. 521 
46. Schelbred A, Nord R. Nurses' experiences of drug administration errors. J Adv Nurs 522 
2007;60:317–24. 523 
47. Schwappach D, Hochreutener M, von Laue N, et al. Konkretisierung im nationalen 524 
Kontext. In: Schwappach D, Hochreutener M, von Laue N, et al., Hrsg. Täter als Opfer: 525 
Konstruktiver Umgang mit Fehlern in Gesundheitsorganisationen [Schriftenreihe Nr. 3, 526 
Empfehlungen für Kader, Kollegen und Betroffene]. Zürich: Patientensicherheit Schweiz, 527 
2010. 528 
48. Ullström S, Sachs MA, Hansson J, et al. Suffering in silence: a qualitative study of second 529 
victims of adverse events. BMJ Qual Saf 2014;23:325–31. 530 
49. van Gerven E, Deweer D, Scott SD, et al. Personal, situational and organizational 531 
aspects that influence the impact of patient safety incidents: a qualitative study. Rev Calid 532 
Assist 2016;31:34–46. 533 
17 
50. van Gerven E, Bruyneel L, Panella M, et al. Psychological impact and recovery after 534 
involvement in a patient safety incident: a repeated measures analysis. BMJ open 535 
2016;6:e011403. 536 
51. Lewis EJ, Baernholdt MB, Yan G, Guterbock TG. Relationship of adverse events and 537 
support to RN Burnout. J Nurs Care Qual 2015;30:144–52. 538 
52. West CP, Huschka MM, Novotny PJ, et al. Association of perceived medical errors with 539 
resident distress and empathy: a prospective longitudinal study. JAMA 2006;296:1071–540 
78. 541 
53. Scott SD. Second victim support: implications for patient safety attitudes and perceptions. 542 
PSQH 2015:26–31. 543 
54. Sammer CE, Lykens K, Singh KP, et al. What is patient safety culture? A review of the 544 
literature. J Nurs Scholarsh 2010;42:156–65. 545 
55. Burlison JD, Quillivan RR, Scott SD, et al. The effects of the second victim phenomenon 546 
on work-related outcomes: connecting self-reported caregiver distress to turnover 547 
intentions and absenteeism. J Patient Saf 2016. 548 
56. Edrees H, Connors C, Paine L, et al. Implementing the RISE second victim support 549 
programme at the johns hopkins hospital: a case study. BMJ Open 2016;6. 550 
57. Newman MC. The emotional impact of mistakes on family physicians. Ann Fam Med 551 
1996;5:71–5. 552 
58. Joesten L, Cipparrone N, Okuno-Jones S, et al. Assessing the perceived level of 553 
institutional support for the second victim after a patient safety event. J Patient Saf 554 
2015;11:73–8. 555 
59. Harrison R, Lawton R, Perlo J, et al. Emotion and coping in the aftermath of medical 556 
error: a cross-country exploration. J Patient Saf 2015;11:28–35. 557 
60. Wu AW, Boyle DJ, Wallace G, et al. Disclosure of adverse events in the United States 558 
and Canada: an update and a proposed framework for improvement. J Public Health Res 559 
2013;2:186. 560 
61. Cabilan CJ, Kynoch K. Experiences of and support for nurses as second victims of 561 
adverse nursing errors: a qualitative systematic review. JBI Database Systema Rev 562 
Implement Rep. 2017;15(9):2333–2364. 563 
62. Kalra J, Kalra N, Baniak N. Medical error, disclosure and patient safety: a global view of 564 
quality care. Clin Biochem 2013;46:1161–9. 565 
63. Ragucci KR, Kern DH, Shrader SP. Evaluation of interprofessional team disclosure of a 566 
medical error to a simulated patient. Am J Pharm Educ 2016;80:138. 567 
64. Monteverde S, Schiess C. Der Umgang mit "second victims" als oragnisationsethische 568 
Aufgabe. Ethik Med 2017;30:205. 569 
18 
65. Kraman SS, Hamm G. Risk management: extreme honesty may be the best policy. Ann 570 
Intern Med. 1999;131:963–7. 571 
66. Carrillo I, Mira JJ, Guilabert M, Lorenzo S. Why an open disclosure procedure is and is 572 
not followed after an avoidable adverse event. J Patient Saf. 2017;00(00):0. 573 
67. Bell SK, Smulowitz PB, Woodward AC, et al. Disclosure, apology, and offer programs: 574 
stakeholders' views of barriers to and strategies for broad implementation. Milbank Q. 575 
2012;90:682–705. 576 
68. Ferrus L, Silvestre C, Olivera G, et al. Qualitative study about the experiences of 577 
colleagues of health professionals involved in an adverse event. J Patient Saf 2016. 578 
69. Mira JJ, Lorenzo S, Carrillo I, et al. Interventions in health organisations to reduce the 579 
impact of adverse events in second and third victims. BMC Health Serv Res 2015;15:341. 580 
70. Schwappach D, Hochreutener M, von Laue N, et al., Hrsg. Täter als Opfer: Konstruktiver 581 
Umgang mit Fehlern in Gesundheitsorganisationen [Schriftenreihe Nr., 3, Empfehlungen 582 
für Kader, Kollegen und Betroffene]. Zürich: Patientensicherheit Schweiz, 2010. 583 
71. Kellogg KM, Hettinger Z, Shah M, et al. Our current approach to root cause analysis: is it 584 
contributing to our failure to improve patient safety? BMJ Qual Saf. 2017;26(5):381–7. 585 
72. Schiess C, Schwappach D, Schwendimann R, Kobleder A, Senn B. The second victims 586 
of human fallibility. Krankenpfl. 2016;109:8–11. 587 
73. Daniels RG, McCorkle R. Design of an evidence-based “second victim” curriculum for 588 
nurse anesthetists. AANA J 2016;84:107–13. 589 
74. Burlison JD, Scott SD, Browne EK, et al. The Second Victim Experience and Support 590 
Tool: validation of an organizational resource for assessing second victim effects and the 591 
quality of support resourcess. J Patient Saf 2017;13:93–102. 592 
75. Mohrer D, Liberati A, Tetzlaff J, et al. Preffered reporting items for systematic reviews and 593 
meta-analysis: the PRISMA statement. J Clin Epidemiol 2009;62:1006–12. 594 
76.  International Organization for Standardization, International Standard ISO 5807: 595 
Information Processing – Documentation Symbols and Conventions for Data, Program 596 
and System Flowcharts, Program Networks, Charts and Syste Ressources Charts. 597 
1985. Available at: https://www.iso.org/obp/ui/#iso:std:iso:5807:ed-1:v1:en/. Accessed 598 
November 16, 2017. 599 
19 
FIGURES & TABLES 600 
Figures 601 
Figure 1: Flow diagram of included studies following Moher et al. (2009)75 602 
Figure 2: Methodological quality of inclued studies 603 
 (author’s own chart, elaborated by means of review manager 5.3, Nordic 604 
Cochrane Centre, 2014) 605 
Figure 3: Transactional "second victim" experience 606 
(author’s own chart) 607 
Figure 3 Legend: Legend relating to figure 3, legend based on the International 608 
Organization for Standardization (1985)76 609 
 610 
Tables 611 
Table 1: Search string in PubMed, CINAHL and PsycINFO 612 
 (author’s own chart) 613 
Table 2: Study characteristics 614 
 (author’s own chart) 615 
Table 3: Metasummary 616 
 (author’s own chart) 617 
 618 
 619 
Table 1: Search string in PubMed, CINAHL and PsycINFO  
Concepts Key words combined with Boolean operators  
Setting "acute care" OR "acute care setting" OR "acute care settings" OR "acute setting" OR "acute settings" OR 
"clinic" OR "clinics" OR "hospital" OR "hospitals" 
 AND 
Population "healthcare professional" OR "healthcare professionals" OR "healthcare provider" OR "healthcare 
providers" OR "resident" OR "residents" OR "second victim" OR "second victims" 
 AND 
Causes "adverse event" OR "adverse events" OR "adverse patient event" OR "adverse patient events" OR 
"error" OR "errors" OR "mistake" OR "mistakes" OR "patient harm" OR "patient harms" OR "patient 
safety event" OR "patient safety events" OR "patient safety incident" OR "patient safety incidents" OR 
"unanticipated outcome" OR "unanticipated outcomes" 
 AND 
Evaluation "affected" OR "anger" OR "anxiety" OR "burnout" OR "coping" OR "depression" OR "distress" OR 
"emotional" OR "experience" OR "fatigue" OR "fear" OR "feelings" OR "frustration" OR "guilt" OR 
"impact" OR "meaning" OR "psychological" OR "safety culture" OR "sleep" OR "stress" OR "support" OR 
"traumatic" 
 AND 
Design "content analysis" OR "ethnographic study" OR "ethnography" OR "grounded theory" OR "interview" OR 
"interviews" OR "interviewed" OR "phenomenological study" OR "phenomenology" OR "qualitative study" 
OR "thematic analysis" 
(author’s own chart) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of included studies  
Author
/year 
Design/Setting/ 
Country 
Sample Event Aim/Research 
question 
Data collection Data analysis Results 
B
al
og
un
 e
t a
l.,
 2
01
53
2  
Design: 
Explorative-descriptive 
qualitative design 
 
Setting: 
University hospitals 
(n=6) 
 
Country: 
Canada 
Targeted sample: 
23 physicians, 27–37 
years with various 
ethnic and religious 
background (assistant 
physicians n=14; 
physicians in specialist 
training: n=9; 
neurosurgery: n=12; 
general surgery: n=8; 
women: n=7; men: 
n=16) 
Catastrophic error 
events; defined as error 
events having entailed 
serious harm or having 
resulted in deaths 
The aim was to 
understand the 
response and coping 
strategies of surgical 
assistants and to 
recommend 
possibilities of support. 
Semi-structured 
individual 
interviews  
(n=23) 
Open and axial 
coding (Strauss 
et al., 1990) 
Indications that catastrophic error events represent system 
deficits rather than individual errors. In spite of experiencing 
a wide array of emotions, surgical assistance physicians 
learn from error events. Irrespective of highly valued 
mentoring relationships with senior staff, they do not feel 
safe enough to actively approach superiors. Consulting 
services should be at their disposal, probably offering a 
benefit.  
Surgical culture proved to be a barrier to help-seeking 
behaviour as emotional vulnerability is often equated with 
personal weakness. 
C
hr
is
te
ns
en
 e
t a
l.,
 
19
92
33
 
Design:  
Explorative-descriptive 
qualitative design 
 
Setting:  
Public hospital 
 
Country:  
USA 
Targeted sample: 
11 physicians with 
practical experience 
between 4 and 18 
years (min. 4 years) 
(medical sub-
specialities: n=7; 
general medicine: n=3; 
women: n=3; men: n=8) 
Error events; 
individually defined by 
physicians 
The aim was to 
describe how 
physicians think and 
feel about error events 
and to investigate 
which beliefs influence 
their emotional 
response. 
Semi-structured 
individual 
interviews 
(n=11) 
Analysis 
according to 
guideline criteria 
Indications that physicians experience error events in a 
unique way and are affected by a wide sphere of long-
lasting emotions. After an initial shock, they experience e.g. 
fear, guilt, anger, embarrassment, humiliation and 
depressive symptoms. Emotion-focused and problem-
centred coping (e.g. dealing emotionally with the event or 
learning from the event) are significantly influenced by 
insufficient control, characteristic for medicine. Disclosing an 
event towards patients rarely occurs. 
C
rig
ge
r e
t a
l.,
 2
00
73
4  
Design:  
Grounded Theory 
 
Setting:  
Public hospital 
 
Country: 
USA 
Theoretical sample:  
10 nurses between 25 
and 57 years with 
practical experience 
between one year and 
35 years and various 
ethnic, religious and 
educational 
background (Bachelor 
of Nursing: n=8; 
Associate Degree: n=2; 
women: n=9; men: n=1) 
Error events;  
defined as measures 
having actually or 
potentially entailed 
harm 
The aim was to 
investigate the 
psychosocial process 
starting with the 
realization of an error 
event and to examine 
how participants 
manage to reconcile 
their self-esteem and 
professional image 
(self-reconciliation). 
Semi-structured 
individual 
interviews  
(n=10) 
Open, selective 
and axial coding 
of transcripts 
Indications that following error events, nurses pass a 
process of four consecutive and/or discursive steps leading 
to self-reconciliation with regard to self-esteem, personality 
and professional image. The four steps comprise realisation 
of having committed an error (reality hitting), evaluating the 
need to disclose the event (weighing in), deciding the best 
way of responding (acting) and evaluating the event and 
subsequently "moving on“ (repair). 
E
ng
el
 e
t a
l.,
 2
00
63
5  
Design:  
Explorative-descriptive 
qualitative design 
 
Setting:  
University hospital  
 
Country:  
USA 
Stratified random 
sample:  
26 assistant physicians 
between 25 and 39 
years with various 
educational 
backgrounds 
(medicine: n=17; 
surgery n=5; 
gynaecology and 
obstetrics: n=4; women: 
n=12; men: n=14) 
Error; defined as the 
failure of a planned 
action to be completed 
as intended or the use 
of a wrong plan to 
achieve this aim". 
"Near miss" is defined 
as “an event or 
situation that could 
have resulted in an 
accident, injury, or 
illness, but did not, 
either by chance or 
through timely 
intervention“ 
The aim was to 
investigate the 
emotional challenges 
associated with medical 
error events and the 
ways of coping with this 
difficult events 
Semi-structured 
individual 
interviews 
(n=26) 
Iterative analysis Indication that following adverse events, assistant 
physicians have to deal with distress and intensive 
emotional responses, e.g. guilt, self-doubt, frustration, 
anger, confusion, fear, isolation, depending on the degree of 
negative effects associated with the event. While coping 
requires relief and learning possibilities, conversations about 
error events with other healthcare professionals and 
superiors proved to be of central significance. 
Author
/year 
Design/Setting/ 
Country 
Sample Event Aim/Research 
question 
Data collection Data analysis Results 
K
ro
ll 
et
 a
l.,
 2
00
83
6  
Design:  
Explorative-descriptive 
qualitative design 
 
Setting: 
Hospitals 
(n=10) 
 
Country:  
England 
Stratified random 
sample:  
38 assistant physicians 
with experience in their 
role between 6 and 12 
months 
Error events;  
not defined (e.g. 
diagnosis or treatment 
error) 
The aim was to 
investigate the 
experiences, 
perceptions and 
meaning of error events 
and to examine 
reasons for and against 
disclosure 
Semi-structured 
individual 
interviews 
(n=38) 
Open, axial and 
selective coding 
according to a 
modified 
Grounded 
Theory approach 
(no reference 
indicated) 
Indications that assistant physicians to some extent 
informally discuss error events in supportive teams with 
peers. Disclosing an error event towards patients is, 
however, rare. In dealing with error events, many assistant 
physicians received support and attributed a central, 
favourite role to colleagues with regard to prevention and 
minimisation of harm. While formal conversations and 
constructive-supportive feedbacks can probably enhance 
learning, accusations and reassurance proved obstructive if 
they were preferred to learning.  
Lu
u 
et
 a
l.,
 2
01
23
7  
Design:  
Grounded Theory 
 
Setting: 
University hospitals 
(n=3) 
 
Country:  
Canada 
Theoretical sample: 
Stage I: 20 experienced 
(n=12) and 
inexperienced (n=8) 
surgeons (general 
surgery: n=13; 
neurosurgery: n=3; 
cardiosurgery/urology, 
gynaecology/obstetrics 
/vascular surgery: 1 
n=1; women: n=5; men: 
n=15) 
Stage II: Six general 
surgeons, allowing to 
be interviewed within 
24 hours after an 
adverse event  
Adverse events;  
defined as events 
entailing harm caused 
by medical treatment 
and not by the course 
of the disease. 
The aim was to 
investigate responses 
and psychological 
consequences of 
adverse events and to 
assess them with 
regard to judgement 
and decision-making. 
Semi-structured 
individual 
interviews  
(stage I: n=20) 
(stage II: n=6) 
Inductive 
qualitative data 
analysis with 
subsequent 
deductive-
qualitative 
analysis of the 
reference model 
(Scott et al., 
2009)  
Indications that surgeons have the impression to be "the 
only one“ experiencing fear, stress and self-doubts, with 
possible gender differences. The authors elaborated a four-
stage response conforming to the model of Scott et al. 
(2009), ranging from feelings of failure accompanied by 
physiological stress response, loss of control and concurrent 
need for recovery and restoration, involving long-term 
effects (meaningfulness vs. change of occupation, 
consequences concerning judgement and decision-making). 
M
an
ka
ka
 e
t a
l.,
 2
01
43
8  
Design:  
Phenomenology 
 
Setting: 
University hospital with 
patients after adverse 
events in regional 
hospitals (n=6) and 
university hospitals 
(n=2) 
 
Country:  
Switzerland 
Targeted sample: 
8 assistant physicians 
(general internal 
medicine) between 28 
and 33 years between 
second and sixth year 
of assistance, being 
responsible for typical 
adverse events. 
Error events; 
not defined (e.g., 
missed diagnosis, 
inadequate monitoring) 
The aim was to answer 
the question: How do 
assistant physicians 
experience medical 
error events and which 
kinds if coping 
strategies do they 
utilize?  
Semi-structured 
individual 
interviews 
(n=8) 
Inductive-
thematic 
analysis with 
deductive 
approaches 
Indications that following error events caused by e.g. 
tiredness or overwork, assistant physicians can be affected 
by strong emotional distress in the context of insufficient 
safety cultures. However they can also receive various 
forms of support from superiors. The most important coping 
strategy proved to be talking about error events. Defensive 
and constructive changes are possible as a result of error 
events. Male physicians seem to be less sensitive and more 
self-confident than female physicians.  
Author
/year 
Design/Setting/ 
Country 
Sample Event Aim/Research 
question 
Data collection Data analysis Results 
M
ay
 e
t a
l.,
 2
01
23
9  
Design:  
Explorative-descriptive 
qualitative design 
 
Setting: 
Academic institutions 
and medical practices 
 
Country:  
USA 
Casual sample: 
61 physicians (women: 
n=28; men: n=33),  
average: 46 years, from 
various subspecialties, 
being ready to talk 
about an adverse event 
(most frequently 
misdiagnosis) disclosed 
to patients and families 
in 61% of cases. 
Included are data of 46 
physicians reaching 
“wisdom” after being 
involved in an error 
event.  
Serious error events; 
defined as events 
having resulted in 
disability, extended 
length of stay or deaths 
The aim was to 
investigate the 
significance of talking 
to patients, colleagues 
and families following 
serious error events. 
Semi-structured 
in-depth 
individual 
interviews 
(n=61) 
Coding 
according to the 
interview-
guideline with 
subsequent 
modified 
taxonomic 
analysis 
(Spadley, 1979) 
Indications that not talking about serious error events has an 
isolating effect on physicians, prevents from reflecting the 
event, thereby impeding the possibility of learning. While 
serious conversations are of central importance with regard 
to recovery and attribution of meaning, dishonest, inhuman, 
accusatory, insensitive or egotistical ways of talking about 
the event proved obstructive. This is also the case for "well-
intended“ minimalisation of the error on the part of 
colleagues and family members. Fearing legal 
consequences of conversations represents a major barrier 
to talking openly about the error event. 
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Design:  
Phenomenology 
 
Setting: 
Public and private 
hospitals 
(n=4) 
 
Country:  
Iran 
Targeted sample: 
8 nurses (Bachelor 
degree: n=6; Master 
degree: n=2; women: 
n=6, men: n=2) 
between 30 and 50 
years old with 
professional experience 
between one year and 
24 years 
Error events; 
not defined 
The aim was to answer 
the question: What 
does it mean to be 
perceived as a culprit 
due to involvement in 
an error event? 
Semi-structured 
individual 
interviews 
(n=8) 
Thematic 
analysis (van 
Manen, 2001) 
Indications that following error events, nurses are confronted 
with unpleasant physical symptoms (e.g., heat sensitivity), 
negative emotions (e.g., fear), and remorse. Additionally, 
they are affected by detailed traumatic memories. Changes 
resulting from error events can affect the assumption of 
responsibility, learning from error events, strengthening 
supportive relationships and spirituality. 
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Design:  
Phenomenology 
 
Setting: 
University hospitals  
(n=2) 
 
Country:  
England 
Targeted sample: 
27 specialist physician 
(general/vascular 
surgery; women n=5; 
men: n=22) with 
professional experience 
in the current position 
of minimal three years 
Surgical complications; 
defined as deviation of 
post-surgical standard 
The aim was to 
investigate personal 
and professional 
consequences of 
surgical complications 
and to examine factors 
influencing the 
response as well as 
coping with 
consequences and use 
of support. 
Semi-structured 
individual 
interviews 
(n=27) 
Interpretative 
phenomeno-
logical analysis 
(Smith et al., 
2003) 
Indications that owing to complications, surgeons in the long 
term are affected by personal and professional 
consequences (emotional, behavioural, cognitive, social and 
otherwise), according to the possibility of avoiding these 
complications. Influencing factors consist of the 
particularities of the individual case, the surgeon´s own 
personality, as well as characteristics of patients and 
families (e.g. outcomes and reactions), teams and 
organisations (e.g. blame-culture). Discussions about 
complications, reconstruction of the event and 
rationalization, aiming at problem- and  
emotion-focused coping proved to be the most important 
and most frequently available resource, in addition to 
collegial support. In contrast, organisational support was 
described as insufficient. 
Author
/year 
Design/Setting/ 
Country 
Sample Event Aim/Research 
question 
Data collection Data analysis Results 
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Design:  
Grounded Theory 
 
Setting: 
Academic institutions 
and medical practices  
 
Country:  
USA 
Casual sample: 
61 physicians (women: 
n=28; men: n=33) with 
a median age of 46, 
various specialisations, 
willing to talk about a 
serious error event 
(mostly diagnostic 
error). Disclosure to 
patients occurred in 
61% of cases. Data are 
considered of 46 
physicians who 
reached “wisdom" after 
error involvement.  
Serious error events; 
defined as events 
having actually or 
potentially entailed 
harm (including 
disability, death or 
additional medical care) 
 
The aim was to 
investigate the 
experience of positive 
coping associated with 
serious error events 
Semi-structured 
individual 
interviews  
(n=61) 
Data analysis 
according to 
Grounded 
Theory (coding 
and constant 
comparative 
analysis) 
Indications that as a result of serious adverse events, 
physicians can attain growth and "wisdom“ via a circular 
process. After accepting the reality, learning from the event 
becomes possible as the basis for integrating experiences 
and reaching advanced ways of perceiving, thinking and 
acting. In this context, "wisdom“ can be interpreted as a 
result of reflected experience. A central aspect of this 
experience is the development of a balance between 
humility regarding imperfection and self-confidence as a 
result of positive changes 
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Design:  
Explorative-descriptive 
qualitative design 
 
Setting: 
Major national hospital 
 
Country:  
Israel 
Casual sample: 
21 nurses (Bachelor 
degree: 60%; women: 
n=14; men: n=7), 
between 21 and 52 
years of professional 
experience, having 
been involved in a 
medication error. The 
event occurred 
between three and 24 
months before the 
interview 
Medication error; 
defined as, e.g., 
dosage errors or 
administration error 
The aim was to 
investigate the 
consequences of 
medication errors on 
the psychological and 
social condition. The 
focus was on subjective 
perception of the error 
event and coping with 
consequences. 
Semi-structured 
in-depth 
individual 
interviews  
(n=21) 
Content analysis 
(Berg, 1998) 
Indications that stress, pressure and negligence represent 
central error-promoting factors in the process of medication. 
Nurses respond to some extent in a long-term physical and 
emotional way (e.g., with fear and guilt). Initially they try to 
cope with consequences and with their responsibility in a 
rather problem-focused way. Afterwards they pass over to a 
rather emotion-focused manner of coping, e.g., by talking 
with their family about error events and by learning from this 
event.  
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Design:  
Explorative-descriptive 
qualitative design 
 
Setting: 
Local health care 
service and university 
hospital  
 
Country:  
Italy 
Targeted sample: 
33 healthcare 
professionals (nurses: 
n=20; physicians: n=6; 
midwifes: n=4; others: 
n=3; women: n=20; 
men: n=13) with 
professional experience 
between 3 and 20 
years, being able to 
describe minimally one 
(most serious) event, 
having occurred 
between five and 132 
months before the 
interview 
Adverse events; 
not defined 
The aim was to 
investigate 
psychosocial 
consequences of 
adverse events, 
focusing on recovery 
and current support. 
Semi-structured 
individual 
interviews 
(n=33) 
Analysis by 
means of 
Qualitative Data 
Analysis Guides 
of Leuven 
(Dierkx de 
Casterleé et al., 
2012) 
Indications that following adverse events, healthcare 
professionals can be affected by headache and stomach 
pain, additionally to the physical and psychosocial 
symptoms often described in the literature, e.g., extreme 
tiredness, increased respiratory rate, intrusions, fear of 
returning to the work place). In this study, participants 
passed through the six stages towards restoring integrity 
described by Scott et al. (2009) in an American comparative 
population. Participants expressed their wish for external 
psychological support and experienced support they 
received as insufficient. Therefore, less than half of the 
participants made use of psychological support. The need to 
talk about the event and to receive understanding was 
particularly pronounced. 
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Design:  
Explorative-descriptive 
qualitative design 
 
Setting: 
Hospital 
 
Country:  
Brasil 
Targeted sample:  
15 nurses 
(predominantly female 
nursing assistants) 
between 22 and 49 
years, having been 
involved in an 
medication error 
Medication error; 
not defined 
The aim was to identify 
feelings and coping 
strategies 
Semi-structured 
individual 
interviews 
(n=15) 
Thematic 
analysis (Polit et 
al., 2004) 
Indications that after medication errors, nurses can be 
affected by panic, despair, concern, guilt, shame and 
uncertainty. To reach a feeling of calmness, they search for 
help in conversations and learn from error events, thereby 
developing strategies to avoid error events in the future. 
Author
/year 
Design/Setting/ 
Country 
Sample Event Aim/Research 
question 
Data collection Data analysis Results 
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Design:  
Explorative-descriptive 
qualitative design 
 
Setting: 
Hospitals, community 
services, nursing 
homes  
(n=7 bzw. n=2 bzw. 
n=1) 
 
Country:  
Norway 
Targeted sample: 
10 nurses with 
professional experience 
between 6 months and 
almost 30 years, 
involved in medication 
errors having actually 
or potentially resulted in 
significant patient harm 
Medication error; 
defined as events 
having actually or 
potentially entailed 
significant injuries 
(e.g., dosage error or 
application error) 
The aim was to 
describe the 
experiences of nurses 
involved in serious 
medication errors in 
order to investigate 
which kind of support 
they received after 
disclosing the error 
event. 
Semi-structured 
in-depth 
individual 
interviews 
(n=10) 
Phenomenologic
al interpretation 
and analysis 
(Giorgi, 1985 
and 1997) 
Indications that following medication errors, nurses are 
personally and professionally deeply affected, depending, in 
part, on others´ responses.  
Immediately after a medication error, they respond with 
panic. However, despite paralysis, exhaustion and loss of 
control, they try everything to alleviate the harm experienced 
by the affected patient. Particularly after events entailing 
irreversible harm, nurses report about personal and 
professional traumatization, accompanied by guilt, shame, 
betrayal, suicidal thoughts or the intention to leave the 
profession. Most nurses articulate the need for support and 
attest a better healing effect to conversations with 
colleagues than with friends or family members. However, 
they mostly do not receive sufficient support. Overall, nurses 
are willing to share their experience. This, however, implies 
the possibility to feel trust. 
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Design:  
Explorative-descriptive 
qualitative design 
 
Setting: 
Hospitals 
 
Country:  
Switzerland 
Targeted sample: 
11 nurses, 7 physicians 
Error event; 
not defined 
The aim was to 
investigate the needs 
for supportive 
interventions and to 
identify factors allowing 
and fostering positive 
coping and overcoming 
error-related stress. 
Focus group 
interviews (n=3) 
Qualitative 
analysis 
Indications that nurses and physicians in Swiss hospitals are 
affected by emotional responses similar to those described 
in international literature (e.g., vegetative reactions, guilt, 
shame). To receive support, they search for a person of 
trust and articulate the need for a committee offering support 
on the emotional level, supplementary to the CIRS 
committee. They also express the necessity of education 
and further education as well as for support programs with 
the aim of learning to cope with error events. According to 
the results, nurses show different ways of dealing with error 
events.  
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Design:  
Explorative-descriptive 
qualitative design 
 
Setting: 
University hospital 
 
Country:  
USA 
Targeted sample: 
31 health care 
professionals with 
professional experience 
between six months 
and 36 years 
(physicians: n=10; 
nurses: n=11; others: 
n=10; women: n=18; 
men: n=13); the event 
took place between 
three months and 44 
months before the 
interview 
Adverse event; 
not defined 
The aim was to 
describe and 
characterize the 
experiences and the 
course of restoration 
Semi-structured 
individual 
interviews  
(n=31) 
Iterative reading, 
classification of 
stages and 
characterisation 
Indication that confrontation with an adverse patient event 
can be a life-altering experience for healthcare 
professionals, independent of gender, profession and 
professional experience, releasing psychosocial (frustration) 
and physical symptoms (extreme tiredness) as well as 
trigger-related flashbacks. Emotions can be classified by 
means of a six-step course leading towards restoration, 
comprising chaos, response, intrusions, restoration of 
personal integrity, enduring the investigation, receiving 
emotional first aid and “moving on“ in three ways: leaving 
the profession, surviving or thriving in professional life. 
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Design:  
Explorative-descriptive 
qualitative design 
 
Setting: 
University hospital 
 
Country:  
Sweden 
Targeted sample: 
21 health care 
professionals with 
professional experience 
between five and 30 
years (physicians: 
n=10; nurses: n=9; 
others: n=2; women: 
n=16; men: n=5) 
Serious adverse 
events;  
defined as events 
having actually caused 
harm or having a high 
risk to cause harm 
(e.g., medication error 
or diagnostic error) 
The aim was to 
investigate how 
healthcare 
professionals are 
affected by avoidable 
serious adverse events; 
the focus was on 
desired and received 
organisational support. 
Semi-structured 
individual 
interviews 
(n=21) 
Qualitative 
content analysis 
(Shanon et al., 
2005; 
Graneheim et 
al., 2004) 
Indications that adverse events can have a personal effect 
(emotional distress) as well as a professional long-term 
effect on health care professionals, depending on the 
response of the organisation. Many professionals react 
emotionally, e.g., with shock, sadness or fear and feel 
uncertain about their professional role. Although they 
express the need to talk about the event and to receive 
emotional support from the organisation and from peers, 
organisational support is insufficient, unstructured and 
unsystematic. Lack of support and feedback complicates 
emotional processing. 
Author
/year 
Design/Setting/ 
Country 
Sample Event Aim/Research 
question 
Data collection Data analysis Results 
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Design:  
Explorative-descriptive 
qualitative design 
 
Setting: 
Hospitals 
 
Country:  
Belgium 
Casual sample: 
31 health care 
professionals (nurses: 
n=17; physicians; n=11; 
midwives: n=3), having 
been directly involved 
in patient safety events 
resulting in deaths 
(n=14), serious harm 
(n=9), short-term harm 
(n=7) or no harm (n=1). 
Excluded were health 
care professionals 
having been involved in 
legal cases or having 
been involved only 
indirectly in patient 
safety events 
Patient safety events;  
defined as events or 
circumstances causing 
or having caused harm 
The aim was to identify 
the consequences of 
patient safety events 
with regard to coping 
strategies, support 
needs and received 
support and to identify 
factors influencing the 
extent of "second 
victim" experience. 
Semi-structured 
in-depth 
individual 
interviews  
(n=31) 
Using sensitive 
concepts 
(Bower, 2006) 
Indications that following serious patient safety events, 
healthcare professionals are personally and professionally 
affected by symptoms presenting on an emotional, 
psychological and physical level. They use several problem- 
and emotion-focused coping strategies. One of the aims 
consists of learning from the event. Therefore, “second 
victims“ should be, for example, integrated into root-cause 
analyses. However, repression and flight are also common 
ways of coping. To openly discuss patient safety events, 
safety culture is required as a supportive basis, formed by 
colleagues, families and professionals. The extent of the 
consequences on „second victims“ depends on various 
personal, situational and organisational aspects 
(author’s own chart) 
Table 3: Metasummary 
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Balogun et al., 
201532 33 10 10 21 1  100 4 
Christensen et 
al., 199233 34 24 48 32 7  100 7 
Crigger et al., 
200734 11 10 33 67 1  100 6 
Engel et al., 
200635 39 4 29 17   80 4 
Kroll et al., 
200836 32 14 11 15 1  100 4 
Luu et al., 
201237 22 9 24 19 5  100 4 
Mankaka et al., 
201438 17 12 15 13   80 3 
May et al., 
201239 87  8 10   60 5 
Mohsenpour et 
al., 201640 23 10 90 18   80 7 
Pinto et al., 
201341 45 25 29 26 1  100 6 
Plews-Ogan et 
al., 201342 11 5 3 57 16  100 5 
Rassin et al., 
200543 8 5 16 16   80 2 
Rinaldi et al., 
201644 30  64 15 9  80 6 
Santos et al., 
200745 4 1 18 8 1  100 2 
Schelbred et 
al., 200746 47  44 39 7  80 7 
Schwappach et 
al., 201047 76 3 11 9   80 5 
Scott et al., 
20092 25 4 50 20 14  100 6 
Ullström et al., 
201448 34 7 39 21 2  100 5 
van Gerven et 
al., 201649 114 17 73 57 3  100 13 
Frequency (%)         
dichotomous 100 84 100 100 68    
continually 34 8 31 4 3    
Records identified through 
database searching 
(n=183)
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Records after duplicates 
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(n=243)
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(title and abstract)
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(n=196)
Full-text articles 
assessed for eligibility
(n=47)
Full-text articles excluded, 
with reasons
(n=28)
Different type of publication (n=16)
Different design (n=8)
Different focus (n=4)
Studies included in 
qualitative metasynthesis 
(n=19)
Records identified through 
hand searching and 
expert consultation
(n=327)
Studies included through 
database searching update
(n=0)
 
Figure 1: Flow diagram of included studies, following Moher et al. (2009)75 
 
Legend: green=adequate, yellow=unclear, red=problematic 
Supplement 2: Methodological quality of included studies 
(author’s own chart, elaborated by means of review manager 5.3, Nordic Cochrane Centre, 2014). 
 Figure 2: Transactional "second victim" experience 
(author’s own chart) 
